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Retail payments: integration and innovation 
“Retail payments: integration and innovation” was the title of the joint conference organised by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) in Frankfurt am Main on 25 and 26 May 2009. Around 200 high-level 
policy-makers, academics, experts and central bankers from more than 30 countries of all five continents attended the 
conference, reflecting the high level of interest in retail payments. 
The aim of the conference was to better understand current developments in retail payment markets and to identify 
possible future trends, by bringing together policy conduct, research activities and market practice. The conference was 
organised around two major topics: first, the economic and regulatory implications of a more integrated retail payments 
market and, second, the strands of innovation and modernisation in the retail payments business. To make innovations 
successful, expectations and requirements of retail payment users have to be taken seriously. The conference has shown 
that these expectations and requirements are strongly influenced by the growing demand for alternative banking 
solutions, the increasing international mobility of individuals and companies, a loss of trust in the banking industry and 
major social trends such as the ageing population in developed countries. There are signs that customers see a need for 
more innovative payment solutions. Overall, the conference led to valuable findings which will further stimulate our 
efforts to foster the economic underpinnings of innovation and integration in retail banking and payments. 
We would like to take this opportunity to thank all participants in the conference. In particular, we would like to 
acknowledge the valuable contributions of all presenters, discussants, session chairs and panellists, whose names can be 
found in the enclosed conference programme. Their main statements are summarised in the ECB-DNB official 
conference summary. Twelve papers related to the conference have been accepted for publication in this special series 
of the ECB Working Papers Series. 
Behind the scenes, a number of colleagues from the ECB and DNB contributed to both the organisation of the 
conference and the preparation of this conference report. In alphabetical order, many thanks to Alexander Al-Haschimi, 
Wilko Bolt, Hans Brits, Maria Foskolou, Susan Germain de Urday, Philipp Hartmann, Päivi Heikkinen, Monika 
Hempel, Cornelia Holthausen, Nicole Jonker, Anneke Kosse, Thomas Lammer, Johannes Lindner, Tobias Linzert, 
Daniela Russo, Wiebe Ruttenberg, Heiko Schmiedel, Francisco Tur Hartmann, Liisa Väisänen, and Pirjo Väkeväinen. 
Gertrude  Tumpel-Gugerell    Lex  Hoogduin 
Member of the Executive Board    Member of the Executive Board 
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Payment scale economies affect banking costs, competition in payment services, and 
pricing.  Our scale measure relates operating cost to physical measures of European 
banking "output", finding large economies.  This differs from relating total cost to the 
value of balance sheet assets (the conventional approach).  Interest expenses are excluded 
since differences here are primarily due to mix, not scale.  Also, since standard indicators 
of competition can give inconsistent results, a revenue-based frontier measure is 
developed and applied to European banks, with little difference evident across countries.  
Existing differences in bank prices (EC report) are associated with small differences in 
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1. Introduction. 
The topics of payment scale economies, competition in payment services, and per 
transaction pricing of payment instrument use are intertwined in an important way.  First, 
bank scale economies are seen to be quite large when operating costs are related to 
expanding payment volume and the size of ATM and branch office networks needed to 
deliver services to depositors.  Second, these economies have lowered average payment 
costs in Europe and one can ask where the lower unit costs have ended up, a question 
directly related to competition among banks in supplying payment services.  This task 
would be relatively straightforward if payment use was priced on a transaction basis since 
these prices would likely be falling over time.  However, transaction pricing is not 
common for consumers in Europe or the U.S.   
 
Third, higher revenues to cover higher total payment operating costs, even as unit costs 
are falling, will largely come from prices mostly disconnected from changes in payment 
volume (such as fixed fees tied to deposit accounts, minimum balance requirements, low 
interest paid on deposits, etc.).  This is why payment services are typically viewed as a 
“cost center” not a “profit center”.  Transaction pricing would benefit banks by tying 
revenues more closely to costs so management obtains a clearer picture of where their 
profits are generated, permitting more efficient use of internal investment resources.  
Transaction pricing would also benefit consumers allowing them to balance better the 
cost of using different payment instruments with their assessment of the benefits, saving 
resources for the economy as a whole. 
 
Finally, the more that current bank service pricing is unrelated to payment volume and 
service delivery expansion, the more that these prices will likely rise over time to cover 
the expanded operating expenses even when strong scale effects are evident.  While this 
may suggest the exercise of market power (c.f., European Commission, 2007), an 
alternative interpretation concerns the need to expand revenues as total costs rise since 
revenues are not closely tied to payment and service delivery volumes.  When prices are 
tied to unit costs, revenues rise “automatically” with volume and prices should fall as 
scale economies are realized. 
 
In what follows, payment scale economies are estimated for 11 European countries in 
Section 2.  Estimates are obtained using different methods—some applied to individual 
countries at different points in time and others applied to all 11 countries over time in a 
panel framework.  The results are rather similar, giving us confidence in the strong scale 
effects found.  In Section 3, these scale estimates are used along with other bank cost and 
productivity indicators to assess the relative competitive efficiency of banks across the 
same 11 countries.  The procedure developed borrows from the efficient frontier 
literature and estimates a competition frontier.  These results are then compared to more 
standard measures of banking competition.  Section 4 outlines the potential benefits to 
banks as suppliers of payment services and consumers as users from transaction-based  6
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pricing of payments.  Since unit payment costs have been falling rather than being stable, 
this alters the cost-benefit trade-offs that need to be observed and made by both banks 
and consumers.  But to respond efficiently to these changes, prices and revenues need to 
more closely mirror unit costs and thus changes in volume.  Conclusions are presented in 
Section 5. 
 
2. Payment Scale Economies.
1
2.1 Payment Scale Economies: Different Countries and Different Methods. 
 
Determining scale economies for financial institutions – much less payment scale effects 
– has been difficult due to a lack of appropriate data.  Instead of measuring the flow of 
banking payment, deposit account maintenance, security transaction activity, and loan 
initiation and monitoring services directly, inferences on how costs may vary by size of 
bank and volume of service flow have been typically obtained by relating total operating 
plus interest expenses across banks and over time to the value of their stock of loans, 
securities and (sometimes) deposits, or some other combination of on- or off-balance-
sheet positions in a regression-based cost function framework.  In addition, information 
does not normally exist regarding the adoption of specific technical and other cost-saving 
innovations in banking and the default has been to assume that unknown technical change 
occurs linearly (or quadratically) with the passage of time and/or is somehow associated 
with (embodied in) the cost share or price of particular inputs. 
 
An additional problem, especially in U.S. regression studies, has been that scale economy 
estimations using cross-section data with quadratic functional forms (e.g., translog) will 
understate the economies associated with large banks in the sample.  This is because 
minimizing the sum of squared errors for all sizes of banks in a sample will be dominated 
by the fit estimated for the smaller banks in the sample since these banks often reflect the 
vast majority of observations.  While the downward sloping portion of an estimated 
average cost curve will properly reflect the scale economies for smaller banks, it can 
imply that diseconomies are associated with the largest banks that are under-represented 
in the sample (c.f., McAllister and McManus, 1993).  This problem is solved when a 
more flexible Fourier function form or a spline function is used in place of the translog 
form or when the sampled banks are more equally represented across the range of asset 
size-classes in the data set.  Fortunately, the translog and Fourier forms give very similar 
values at the mean of the data but not for the very largest banks in the sample. 
 
The payment scale economy results shown in Table 1 do not have the problems noted 
above either because they are not regression-based studies (the first four results) or 
because the potential bias from including small banks in the sample has been adjusted for 
(the fifth study).  For example, in the first study card payment costs in Norway were 
observed to rise by 153% between 1994 and 2001 while card transaction volume rose by 
355%.  The ratio of these percent changes yields a scale economy estimate of 0.43 so that 
a doubling of card transaction volume implies that card operating costs rise by only 43% 
                                                
1 Material in this section is drawn from Bolt and Humphrey (2007). 7
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so average cost falls by 29%.
2  However, these card payment costs include concurrent 
increases in labor expenses that should have been excluded to properly reflect scale 
effects alone.  Since the cost of living index in Norway rose by 18% over this period, it is 
clear that holding the price of labor inputs constant would reduce the percent change in 
card costs so the true scale value would be lower than 0.43.  This would indicate greater 
scale benefits since scale economies should be a function of the number of transactions, 
holding input prices and changes in technology constant. 
 
Table 1: Payment Scale Economies: Four Countries, Different Methods. 
 Cash  Card 
Norway 1994-2001       
d(payment costs)/d(volume)    0.43 
    
Netherlands 2002     
Marginal Cost/Average Cost   0.37   0.39 
    
Belgium 2003     
Marginal Cost/Average Cost   0.25   0.39 
    
U.S. 2005     
d(payment costs)/d(volume)    0.31 – 0.39 
    
Netherlands 1997-2005     
Bank Data, Econometric Model     0.27 – 0.31 
Sources: Gresvik and Øwre (2002); Brits and Winder (2005), Table 4.3; Quaden 
(2005), Table 3; First Annapolis Consulting (2006); Bolt and Humphrey (2008b). 
Two other non-regression-based analyses of payments in the Netherlands (Brits and 
Winder, 2005) and Belgium (Quaden, 2005) estimate the average total cost and 
incremental variable cost of using cash and a debit card at the point of sale in 2002 and 
2003.  These estimates are based on data for a point in time, rather than over time, so 
there is no need to adjust for changes in labor input prices or technical change.  As scale 
economies can be expressed as the ratio of marginal to average cost, this gives a point 
estimate of payment scale economies.
3 The implied scale economy for cash ranges 
between 0.37 in the Netherlands to 0.25 in Belgium while the implied scale economy for 
debit cards in both countries is 0.39.  These card scale economies are not very different 
                                                
2 If payment costs and transaction volume are both initially at 100, average cost is 100/100 = 1.0.  When 
volume doubles to 200 but costs only rise by 43% to 143, the new average cost is 143/200 = 0.715 and the 
percent reduction in average cost is (1.0 - .715)/1.0 = 29%. 
 
3 Scale economies (SCE) equal (wOC/OC)/(wQ/Q) or  wln OC/wln Q  where OC is operating cost and Q is 
a measure of output and values < (>) 1.0 represent economies (diseconomies).  SCE can be rewritten as 
(wOC/wQ)/(OC/Q) = marginal cost divided by average cost, where incremental cost approximates marginal 
cost.  As bank interest expenses should be unaffected by changes in payment volume, operating cost – not 
total cost – is the appropriate cost measure to use. 
 8
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from approximate PIN and signature debit card scale values of 0.31 and 0.39 
respectively, for card issuing banks in the U.S. derived from data in the 2005 Issuer Cost 
of Payments Study (First Annapolis Consulting, 2006).  Similar payment scale estimates 
were obtained for the Netherlands using confidential individual bank payment data in an 
econometric model, with results reported at the mean of the data (Bolt and Humphrey, 
2008b). 
2.2 Payments versus Service Delivery: An Output Characteristics Approach. 
 
A different approach which can provide more solidly-based scale economy estimates than 
traditional analyses which uses balance sheet asset value data to represent banking 
physical “output”, relates bank operating (not total) costs to measurable physical 
characteristics of banking output associated with payment processing and service delivery 
levels and mix—a set of four banking output characteristics.  Here the focus is on those 
activities and expenses directly associated with the provision of payment services.     
Interest expenses paid to depositors and with a mark-up charged to borrowers are 
functionally separable from these activities.  This approach determines how the level and 
mix of payment activities, along with the number of ATMs and bank branches, are 
directly associated with the size of a bank and its labor, capital, and materials operating 
cost which reflects scale economies.  In this regard, our approach represents an 
alternative and more direct way to identify the effect of scale and technical change on 
costs in banking.
4 As point of sale and bill payment transactions are jointly processed in 
the deposit accounting function while aspects of service delivery are jointly produced via 
branches and ATMs, these two activities can be considered functionally separable. 
 
The variation of operating cost (OC) across 11 European countries annually over 1987-
2004 is used in a translog cost function to derive scale economies for point of sale 
transactions, bill payments, as well as for ATM and (standardized) branch office 
networks.  All cross-country value/price data are in terms of purchasing power parity 
U.S. dollars since the euro did not exist until 1998.  A translog function (1) and a more 
complex Fourier cost function (not shown) were both estimated for robustness.  As the 
scale results were very similar and the figures of predicted unit payment (seen below for 
the translog) are almost identical, only the translog results are reported here.  The translog 
cost function is estimated jointly with cost share equations (2) for labor:
5  
 
44 4 4 2
0 11 1 1 1
22 2
11 1
ln ln 1/2 ln ln ln ln
ln 1/2 ln ln ln
i i ij i j ik i k ii j i k
kk k mkm O C kk m




        
    
   
 
¦¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
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        (1) 
                                                
4 Our panel data set is a cross-section of 11 countries over 18 years.  The standard way to identify scale 
effects from technical change is to presume that cross-section variation identifies scale while time-series 
variation identifies technical change.  A problem is that payment volume tends to rise at a fairly constant 
rate over time while the simple passage of time itself is used as the (unknown) index of technical change.  
This collinearity problem is reduced when the time pattern of important technical changes is known (which 
rarely occurs). 
 
5 The standard coefficient symmetry and linear homogeneity in input price restrictions are imposed in 
estimation. 9
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24
11 ln ln ln kk k m m i ki S mi SP Q e EE G
       ¦¦                                      (2) 
where: 
 
OC   total operating cost, composed of all labor, materials, outsourcing and capital  
  consumption costs (but no interest expenses); 
i Q   four output characteristics (i = 1, ..., 4) composed of point of sale (POS = card and  
  check) and bill payment (BP = electronic and paper giro) transactions along with the 
  number of automated teller machines (ATM) and size standardized branch offices 
 (
STD BR ).  The standardization procedure is explained below; 
k P   two input prices (k = 1, 2) denoting the average labor cost per bank employee and 
  an opportunity cost approximation to the price of bank physical capital and 
  materials inputs represented by each country’s market interest rate; and 
k S   the cost share for the labor input (the “mirror image” capital/materials input cost
  share is deleted to avoid singularity).  It is expected that operating costs not directly  
  associated with the type of payment or mode and level of service delivery will be 
  represented in the intercept term. 
 
It is clear that a single payment transaction in one country, whether by card, check, giro 
or cash withdrawal from an ATM, is equivalent to a single payment transaction in 
another country.  While there is a great deal of size homogeneity among banking offices 
within a single country, this is not the case for banking offices across countries.
6 
Although the average number of workers per branch office across our 11 countries was 
15.9 it was only 6.7 in Spain but 26.2 in the U.K.  Clearly, each branch office in Spain (or 
Belgium with 10.7 workers per branch) is providing a different level of banking service 
output than occurs in the U.K.  (or Germany with 15.8 workers per office).  An even 
greater dispersion exists for the value of assets generated per branch.
7  It is thus necessary 
to standardize branch office size according to some benchmark to make them more 
comparable across countries.
8 Our view is that the production function relationship 
reflected in the “labor/capital” ratio – tying the labor input to branch payment processing, 
cash access, loan origination and monitoring – reflects better the service flow produced 
by branch offices than the unadjusted number of branches themselves.  France, with an 
                                                
6 When new branches are established in a country they tend to expand in parallel with the growth of their 
local market.  Once a branch reaches a given size, further bank growth occurs via establishing additional 
new branches (or through mergers).  The large differences in branch office size across countries is probably 
due to differences in population density, earlier norms developed when (prior to ATMs) cash could only be 
obtained from a branch office and greater reliance in some countries (France and the U.K.) on checks 
versus cards or cash. 
 
7 The average total asset/branch ratio ranges from $30 to $193 million with an overall average of $96 
million. 
 
8 In partial support of the adjustment, the level of operating cost (or total assets) varies more closely with 
the standardized branch measure (R-squared = 0.76) than it does with the unadjusted number of branches 
(R-squared = 0.57). 
 10
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average of 16.1 workers per office over our 18-year period (close to the overall mean), 
was selected as the branch benchmark and other countries were adjusted accordingly.
9 
Figure 1: Predicted Unit Payment Costs versus Payment Transaction Volume. 
















2.3 Payment Scale Economies for 11 European Countries. 
 
Based on the cost model presented above, Figure 1 shows how predicted bank payment 
cost varies by non-cash transaction volume across countries.  Norway, Finland, Denmark 
and Sweden form the first part of each curve while the middle reflects Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the U.K.  The last part of each curve covers Italy, France and 
Germany.  The curves are cubic splines of the ratio of predicted payment costs (for both 
point of sale and bill payments together) divided by the total number of transactions (Y-
axis) and arrayed against total transactions (X-axis).  Importantly, the curves in Figure 1 
are not average cost curves as the level of these curves (in U.S. cents per transaction) is 
too high.
10 However, the slopes shown are a fair reflection of how payment unit costs 
                                                
9 Specifically, the number of each country’s banking offices (BR) was adjusted as follows: 
>@ ( / )/16.1 STD BR BR L BR   , where L/BR is the observed labor/branch ratio in each country for each year and 
16.1 workers per office is the standardized size of each office.  This gives the number of standardized, size-
adjusted branches (BRSTD) which is used for each country in the estimations, not BR.  For example, the 
average L/BR for the U.K.  was 26.2 workers per office so dividing by the French benchmark gives 
26.2/16.1 = 1.63 which increases by 63% the number of  “standard” U.K. branches used in the analysis.  In 
contrast, since Spain had an average L/BR of 6.7 workers per branch office, dividing by the French 
benchmark gives 6.7/16.1 = 0.42 which reduces the number of  “standard” Spanish offices by close to 60%.  
This was done for each country for each year. 
 
10 This is because predicted payment operating costs are obtained by evaluating the estimated cost function 
by holding input prices and the number of ATMs and branches constant at their mean value.  Although 11
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change with payment volume.  These slopes--and their associated scale economies--vary 
with payment volume but are quite similar for the three years shown.  This suggests that a 
changing payment mix (reflecting possible scope economies) or disembodied technical 
change adds little to the operating cost reductions shown over time. 
 
The payment-related scale economy (SCE) or cost elasticity estimates using the translog 
form are presented in Table 2.  The scale economy for the ith payment service (SCEi) 
from the cost function (1) is 
42
11 ln / ln 1/2 ln ii i j j i k k jk OC Q Q P DD G
   ww     ¦¦ , where: 
i,j = point of sale transactions (POS) and bill payments (BP), number of ATMs (ATM), 
and number of branches (
STD BR ).  Countries are ranked according to their total non-cash 
payment volume in 2004 (Column 1).  Note that in 2004, non-cash payment volume in 
our 11 European countries was 59 billion transactions while in the U.S., it was 85 billion.  
On a per person basis, the U.S. makes 74% more non-cash transactions per year than 
individuals in Europe, indicating a greater degree of cash replacement. 
 
Table 2: Operating Cost to Total Assets, Non-Cash Payment Volumes, and Scale 

























                
Germany  14,748    -40%  0.23  0.06  0.17  0.22  0.59  0.31 
France  13,926  +1 0.30  0.08  0.22  0.31  0.36 0.47 
U.K. 12,919  -52  0.35  0.11  0.24  0.36  0.27  0.54 
Spain   4,335  -50  0.30  0.10  0.20  0.23  0.48  0.45 
Netherlands   3,563  -33  0.17  0.09 0.09 0.24  0.65  0.24 
Italy   3,094  -29  0.21  0.05  0.16  0.17  0.62  0.30 
Belgium   1,594  -23  0.20  0.10  0.10  0.26  0.59  0.26 
Sweden   1,488  -38  0.33  0.18  0.15  0.39  0.37  0.21 
Finland   1,244  -59  0.35  0.19  0.16  0.40  0.34  0.20 
Norway   1,117  -60  0.34  0.19  0.15  0.40  0.34  0.23 
Denmark   1,081  -39  0.24  0.12  0.12  0.28  0.52  0.37 
                
Average   5,374    -34%  0.27  0.11  0.16  0.30  0.47   0.40 
 
The change in bank operating costs as a ratio to asset value, an approximate indicator of 
the unit cost of producing banking services, is shown in Column 2.  Reductions ranged 
from -23% for Belgium to -60% for Norway but was +1% for France.  For all 11 
countries, the average was -34% over 1987-2004. 
  
                                                                                                                               
constant, these mean values and their associated costs add to the level of the payment costs being predicted.  
The inability to obtain average costs for a subset of outputs in a multi-output cost function was noted in 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982). 
 12
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The average scale economy for all payments for each country using the translog cost 
function is shown in Column 3.  The average across countries is 0.27 and indicates that 
substantial scale effects would be expected as payment volume rises.
11  The point of sale 
and bill payment SCEs appear quite low and at 0.11 and 0.16 respectively, are 
considerably lower than independent estimates for Norway, the Netherlands or Belgium 
using different data sources.  The independent estimates include some branch office 
expenses while the econometric analysis holds branches (and their associated expenses) 
constant in order to focus on only payment processing costs and this likely accounts for 
most of the difference. 
 
To gauge robustness, the estimation process was repeated using data from earlier versus 
later time periods, segmenting countries by smaller versus larger payment volumes and 
adding 11 country-specific indicator variables to the model.  The average payment SCE 
results were not markedly different by earlier or later time periods nor for countries 
having smaller versus larger payment volumes compared to using all 11 countries 
together for the entire time period.
12 Also, adding 18 time-specific indicator variables 
yielded little reduction in the positive autocorrelation evidenced in the Durbin-Watson 
statistic for the panel data and had no effect on the number of significant parameters (as 
17 out of the 20 that were common were significant).
13 Finally, a differencing parameter 
(U  0.85) was estimated from the residuals from equations (1) and (2) and used to 
transform the data.  This generated a D-W value close to 2.00 but the cost function 
concavity condition was not met and branch scale economies were negative, suggesting 
that operating costs fall absolutely for countries with larger branch networks.
14 Based on 
these results, a fixed effects estimation framework would not offer any improvement in 
estimation.  More importantly, fully adjusting for positive autocorrelation yields 
anomalous results.
15 Consequently, we focus on the scale economy estimates in Table 2 
                                                
11 Average scale economies of 0.27 were also obtained using cost data specific to 8 European payment 
processor operations over 1990-2005 in a translog econometric model (Beijnen and Bolt, 2009, Model 3b). 
 
12The translog average payment SCE is 0.27 over the entire period and is 0.24 using data for only the first 
half (1987-1995) and 0.35 for the second half (1996-2004).  Restricting the estimation to the 5 countries 
with the smallest payment volumes gives an average payment SCE of 0.30 while for the 6 largest countries 
it is 0.36.  Estimation with 11 country-specific dummies raises the average payment SCE to 0.34 so country 
identification explains some of the reduction in operating cost, leaving less to be associated with our four 
outputs. 
 
13 Estimation with 18 time-specific dummies gives an average payment SCE of 0.20.  Here, all the time 
dummies are positive indicating that the passage of time raises (not lowers) operating cost.  This anomalous 
result likely occurs because we already apparently identify the banking outputs associated with cost curve 
shifts over time in our originally specified variables. 
 
14 Setting U= 0.75 met the concavity condition but branch scale economies were still negative.  Although 
the time sequence of observations is fixed for each country, the ordering of countries in the panel data is 
arbitrary and changes here did lead to some reduction in positive autocorrelation (but of course, had no 
effect on parameter or scale results). 
 
15 Indeed, a grid search using values of U= 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 1.0 to transform the data indicated that the 
average payment SCE (Column 3) was fairly stable up to the point where U= 0.50 but completely fell apart 
when U= 1.0. 13
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which applies a translog cost model using unadjusted levels data for the entire time 
period for all 11 countries together (in panel econometrics jargon, a “total pooled 
regression”).  To correct for heteroskedasticity, Robust-White standard errors were 
calculated and are shown with the estimated parameters in Bolt and Humphrey (2007). 
 
Strong scale economies were also estimated for ATM and branch office networks and 
were 0.30 and 0.47, respectively (Table 2).  These scale effects are illustrated in Figure 2 
where the predicted ATM and branch office delivery costs for different years are summed 
and expressed as a ratio to bank asset value (Y-axis) and arrayed against the log of asset 
value (X-axis).  As was the case for Figure 1, the cubic splines in Figure 2 are not 
average costs but their slopes do reliably reflect the scale economies associated with 
delivering banking services to users. 
 
Figure 2: Predicted Delivery Cost/Total Assets versus ln (Total Asset Value). 













The last column in Table 2 illustrates the scale effects associated with both payments and 
service delivery activities together and is an indicator of total bank scale economies.  It is 
a weighted average of the four scale measures in the table since a simple sum of these 
four scale values would be inappropriate as the quantity expansions of point of sale 
transactions (140%), bill payment transactions (151%), ATMs (434%) and branch offices 
(9.8%) are not equal.  Indeed, the number of branches in all but 4 of the 11 countries 
decreased absolutely rather than expanded.
16  Overall, if a bank doubles its size over time 
                                                
16 A simple sum of individual scale elasticities is only appropriate when the percent changes in output 
quantities are not very different.  This condition is probably close to being met when balance sheet values 
are used to approximate banking output quantities, the usual practice in the literature, as opposed to the 
output characteristics approach used here which reflect actual quantities and where the percent changes are 
markedly different. 14
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or through a merger, its operating costs is estimated to only rise by 40% so its overall 
average costs will fall. 
2.4 Payment Scale Economies: Volume Growth versus Back Office Consolidation. 
 
Payment processing center volume can rise in two different ways: (1) each bank’s 
payment volume in a country rises as users in that country make more payments over 
time; or (2) each bank’s payment volume in a country is combined with the payment 
volume of banks in other countries in a single cross-border payment processing center at 
a point in time.   
 
In (1), rising payment volumes at each bank leads to lower unit payment costs but 
generates higher total operating costs.   Since per transaction pricing is not common in 
Europe or the U.S., total bank revenues do not rise “automatically” with rising operating 
costs and payment prices that do exist need not fall as unit cost falls due to realized scale 
economies (a movement along a downward sloping average cost curve as each bank’s 
payment volume rises).   For this reason, payment activities are often considered a bank 
“cost center” rather than a “profit center”. 
 
In (2), back office consolidation of payment processing centers within or across borders 
can lower each bank’s unit costs as well as decreasing each bank’s total operating cost 
since, at least initially, each bank’s payment volume is constant and the volume 
expansion that generates the scale economies comes from the consolidation (a downward 
shift in the average cost curve for all banks even as their individual payment volumes 
remain constant).  This can be one benefit of a single euro payments area (SEPA). 
 
To illustrate, consolidating debit card volume in Belgium (671 million in 2004) with that 
of the Netherlands (1,247 million) would expand volume at a cross-border Netherlands 
processing center by 54%, suggesting that unit processing cost may decline by 33% if the 
Netherlands/Belgium scale economy of 0.39 in Table 1 is the appropriate metric.
17 If the 
average payment (0.27) or average point of sale (0.11) SCEs in Table 2 were used, the 
change in unit processing costs could be -39% or -48%, respectively.  These reductions in 
unit processing costs would, however, not translate directly into reductions in total unit 
costs since additional telecommunication expenses would need to be factored in (as well 
as the amortized cost of the expanded investment in processing equipment).   
 
Consolidation of existing processing arrangements is clearly more difficult to arrange 
than merely piggy-backing the currently small amount of cross-border card volume onto 
current national processing center operations.  Even so, Interpay, the Dutch processor of 
debit card and giro payments, just completed a merger with its German equivalent 
Transaktionsinstitut (TAI) at the end of 2006.  The merged company – called Equens – 
will double its yearly processed volume from around 3.5 billion transactions each to 7 
                                                
17 Since wlnAC/wlnQ can be re-expressed as SCE – 1, the percent change in average operating cost  is 
wlnAC = wlnQ (SCE - 1) = 54% (0.39 – 1) = -33% when payment volume expands by 54% and the SCE = 
0.39.  AC is average operating cost. 
 15
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1136
December 2009
billion in total, making it one of the largest payment processing centers in Europe.  In a 
recent press release (January 23, 2007), Equens announced that the volume growth from 
their merger will generate large scale benefits and by 2010, they could “realize cost 
savings of approximately 25 percent, which include a reduction of around 400 full-time 
positions and plan to increase the yearly processed payments transactions to 10 billion”.
18  
 
In sum, there are strong scale economies associated with the provision and processing of 
payment transactions by banks as well as in how banks deliver these and other services to 
users through their ATM and branch office networks.  As payment volume expands over 
time or through cross-border consolidation of processing centers, average operating costs 
should fall as they have in the past.  Where this reduction in average cost ends up—in 
lower loan rates, higher deposit rates, lower service prices, or higher profits--is an issue 
of some interest to competition authorities.  However, there are difficulties in determining 
the level of banking or payment market competition, an issue discussed next. 
 
3. An Indirect Assessment of Bank and Payment Market Competition.
19
European banks are estimated to have saved some $32 billion in operating costs over 
1987 to 1999 due to the realization of scale economies as payment volume expanded 
combined with the technology-associated shift from paper-based payments to cheaper 
electronic methods and away from expensive branches toward ATMs for cash acquisition 
(Humphrey, Willesson, Bergendahl, and Lindblom, 2006).  Cost savings are also implied 
from the observed one-third reduction in the average ratio of operating costs to asset 
value over the last 18 years (Table 2).  If European banking markets are reasonably 
competitive, cost reductions should be correlated over time with lower revenue flows 
from loan-deposit rate spreads and non-interest income.  Indeed, this would be one way 
to assess the competitive efficiency of banking markets within and across countries. 
3.1 Payment Competition: Among Instruments or Banks?
 
While payment instruments “compete” with each other for use at the point of sale or for 
bill payments, this competition concerns the inherent characteristics of the different 
payment instruments, such as safety, convenience, availability, etc.  These characteristics 
are not priced and users choose those instruments that best meet their needs, such as 
using cash, cards, or checks at the point of sale or giro versus checks for bill payments.   
This is not the competition we wish to measure since neither regulators nor antitrust 
authorities have any real control over the availability or mix of these instrument-specific 
payment characteristics. 
 
                                                
18 In a recent interview (in Dialogue, Q4 2006, p.10), Ben Haasdijk – former chairman of Equens – stated 
“scale was the main driver for the merger that gave birth to Equens” and that “we will be passing on 
benefits of scale we achieve”. 
 
19 Material in this section is drawn from Bolt and Humphrey (2008a). 16
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When the focus is on suppliers of a specific payment instrument (such as credit cards) or 
where specific payment prices are largely transaction based (such as card interchange 
fees), it is possible to examine the competitive behavior of these suppliers and/or the 
prices they charge.  However, such an investigation is necessarily partial and would not 
address the question of payment market competition more generally.  A broader approach 
would examine payment competition in terms of providing cash, check, card, and giro 
payment services all together. 
 
3.2 Two Problems in Applying Current Measures of Banking Competition to  
      Payments. 
 
Standard indicators of banking competition are: (a) the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm which focuses on the degree of banking market concentration (usually a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of deposit market concentration); (b) the Lerner Index 
which is a price mark-up measure as in (price – marginal cost)/price; and (c) the H-
statistic which indicates the extent that input cost changes are associated with changes in 
price.  The Lerner Index and the H-statistic typically rely on cost and pricing data but 
payment costs are not separately reported and payment instrument use is not typically 
priced on a per transaction basis.  While these measures are used to reflect the 
competitive behavior of the “entire” bank, due to limitations on price data they are more 
reflective of traditional loan/deposit rate spreads.  There are two additional problems. 
 
Problem 1: Non-Proportionality of Unit Payment Revenues With Payment Costs.  
Payment services are typically indirectly priced by banks using fixed monthly account 
maintenance fees, minimum balance requirements, low or no interest paid on deposits, 
account opening/closing charges, etc.  The revenue they generate is not closely tied to 
payment volume.  While a rise in payment volume will increase total payment operating 
costs and unit costs will fall due to strong scale economies in payment processing, total 
payment revenues need not rise proportionally with total payment operating costs. 
 
If per transaction pricing was in place, then proportional changes in costs and revenues 
would be observed unless competition was limited and revenues expanded more than 
proportionally to underlying costs.  Currently, banks could well respond to higher 
payment volume by raising indirect fees (so expanding total operating costs are 
fully/partially covered with higher revenues) even while unit payment costs are falling 
due to scale economies.  As indirect fees are not closely related to variations in payment 
volume while unit and total operating expenses are, relating prices (indirect fees) to unit 
payment costs via a Lerner Index or H-statistic could well show that prices remain 
constant or rise while unit costs are falling, suggesting an uncompetitive market.  Hence 
the need to focus on overall revenues and not on unit revenues (prices).  Fortunately, 
information on bank revenues is often broader and more available than data on prices. 
 
Problem 2: Inconsistencies Among Bank Competition Measures.  While there is 
disagreement about which of the three measures noted above may "best" reflect market 
competition, the expectation is that since they purport to measure the same thing they are 
all positively correlated.  Unfortunately, this expectation is not always met.  These 17
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measures are almost unrelated when compared across European countries over time and 
can be negatively related within the same country over time.  If there was a consensus as 
to which of the indicators is indeed "best", this inconsistency would be mitigated but this 
is not the case so choice among these measures can influence the outcome. 
 
To illustrate: with data on 14 European countries over 1995-2001 covering 1,912 banks, 
the R
2 between the Lerner Index and the H-Statistic was only .06.  Similarly, the R
2 
between the HHI concentration measure (from the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm) and the Lerner Index and H-statistic was, respectively, .09 and .05 (Carbó, 
Humphrey, Maudos, and Molyneux, 2009).
20  In addition, looking at each of the 14 
countries separately over time, the relationship between the Lerner Index and the H-
statistic was positive in only 8 out of 14 countries.  The relationship between the HHI and 
these two measures was positive in only 8 and 5 countries, respectively.  Since the choice 
of an existing banking competition measure may affect the results obtained, a different 
procedure where choice among these current measures is not necessary may prove useful. 
 
3.3 Measuring Competition as Residual Revenues after Accounting for Costs. 
 
Fundamentally, banking revenues are a function of underlying input costs, differences in 
factor productivity, and the degree of competition in the market for banking services.  
After using statistics to “subtract” the value of banking revenues across banks or 
countries associated with input costs, factor productivity (including scale economies), and 
risk, the remaining or residual differences in revenues are likely associated with 
differences in competition.  This approach is broader than the typical procedure used in 
applications of the H-statistic or the Lerner Index in that it does not require information 
on unit revenues (prices) which, for payment and other non-loan activities, is simply not 
available (or if available are indirect fees rather than transaction-based prices).
21 
 
Banks are the main providers of the full set of payment services and it is estimated that 
about 25% of European bank revenues are associated with payment services (McKinsey 
and Company, 2005).  An earlier analysis finds that 20% to 30% of the operating revenue 
of the 25 largest U.S. bank holding companies is associated with payment activities while 
a 2001 update of this study using two different data sources obtained a somewhat wider 
range (Radecki, 1999; Rice and Stanton, 2003).  Unfortunately, information on bank-
provided payment service revenues and costs are not separately reported.   
  
Publicly available data typically only separates banking service revenues into those 
associated with (a) the loan-deposit rate spread which reflects traditional banking 
activities, (b) securities interest revenue, and (c) non-interest revenues associated with all 
other activities which reflect payment activities (such as fees on deposit accounts and 
                                                
20 In this analysis, the H-statistic was multiplied by -1.0 so that a larger value of the H-statistic, the Lerner 
index, and the HHI would all indicate less competition. 
 
21 The limited availability of pricing data is why the Lerner Index and the H-statistic use computed average 
loan and deposit rates along with deposit/funding average or (estimated) marginal costs. 
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other indirect fees) as well as other, newer activities such as trading.  This separates 
spread revenues (which do not involve payments) from other revenues (which do include 
payments) and enables one to focus somewhat more directly on payment activities, albeit 
not as directly as one would like (but better than looking at the variation of all revenues 
from all activities).  Securities interest income is determined in reasonably competitive 
national or international markets and can be neglected here. 
 
3.4  A Competition Frontier.   
 
There are at least four ways to determine a competition frontier from bank data on 
revenues, costs, productivity, and risk.  The approach used here is the composed error 
Distribution Free Approach or DFA (Berger, 1993).
22  This approach assumes that 
averaging each bank’s residuals from the relationship illustrated in (3) and (4) across 
separate cross-section regressions reduces normally distributed error to minimal levels 
leaving only average inefficiency (or the average effect of competition on revenues).  
 
In applying frontier analysis to the measurement of competition, it is maintained that the 
three most important determinants of non-interest income revenues and loan-deposit 
spread revenues are the underlying unit operating costs of producing these services, the 
productivity of the factor inputs used to produce these services, and the existing level of 
market competition.  Two unit revenue functions are specified.  One is the ratio of non-
interest income (NII) to operating cost (OC) and reflects how income from priced 
services (payment transaction fees, ATM fees, deposit account maintenance fees, account 
switching fees, loan fees, loan commitment fees, etc., as well as trading income) varies 
with costs (NII/OC).  A second revenue function reflects the ratio of revenues from the 
loan-deposit rate spread times the value of deposits (SPREAD) to operating cost 
(SPREAD/OC).  Interest revenues not associated with the loan-deposit rate spread (e.g., 
securities income) are excluded since these rates of return are set in competitive national 
and international markets.  Revenues from non-interest income across the same 11 
countries used above was 20% of NII plus SPREAD revenues in 1987 but has grown to 
comprise 44% in 2006.  SPREAD revenues fell from 80% to 56% over this period. 
 
The variation of each dependent variable is a function of four indicators of unit costs: the 
average price of labor (PL), the opportunity cost of investing in physical capital (PK, the 
market interest rate), an index of the unit cost of processing payment transactions (PC), 
and a similar cost index reflecting ATM network scale economies (ATMC).  The payment 
cost index is based on estimated country-specific payment scale economies shown in 
Table 2 above and changes in observed non-cash payment volume.  Similarly, the ATM 
cost index used country-specific ATM scale economies estimates (Table 2) and changes 
in the number of ATMs.  In addition, the variation in each dependent variable can be 
influenced by the use and productivity of labor in producing banking services as 
                                                
22 An alternative Stochastic Frontier Approach typically assumes a half-normal distribution for 
inefficiencies (or in our case competition inefficiencies) in order to separate unknown inefficiencies from 
normally distributed error in a panel regression.  Two other approaches concern  Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull.  These are linear programming approaches that assume error is 
zero but have the advantage that no functional form is imposed to fit the data. 19
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indicated by the labor/deposit ratio (L/DEP), an indicator of the substitution of ATMs for 
more expensive branch offices to deliver cash to depositors (ATM/DEP), a ratio of equity 
plus reserves to loans to account for bank risk that may inflate revenues (CAPITAL) and 
an indicator of the variation in demand for banking services associated with the business 
cycle (GAP a measure of the GDP output gap).  In summary, our two equation translog 
functional form model in logs is: 
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have been defined above. 
 
Equations (3) and (4) are related in that banks may choose to increase revenues over time 
(in response to higher costs or weaker competition) by raising the fees they charge on 
various banking services (affecting NII) or they can instead increase revenues by altering 
their loan-deposit rate spread (raising loan rates and/or lowering deposit rates).  Industry 
observers have suggested that the faster growth in revenues from non-interest income 
activities and the slower growth in revenues from loan-deposit rate spreads is a response 
to expanded competition for loans and deposits which banks, in turn, attempt to offset by 
pricing and pricing higher more non-interest income activities.  Some of these activities 
previously appeared to be "free" as their costs were largely bundled in loan and deposit 
rates.  Since errors in explaining the variation of non-interest revenues in (3) may be 
correlated with errors in explaining the variation of revenues from the loan-deposit rate 
spread in (4), these two revenue equations are estimated jointly in a seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) framework. 
 
In a composed error framework, the regression relationship (3) can for illustration be re-
expressed as: 
 
  l n ( NII/OC) = f (ln Cost, ln Productivity) + ln e + ln u   (5) 
 
The total residual (ln e + ln u) reflects the unexplained portion of the revenue dependent 
variable remaining after cost and productivity influences have been accounted for.  Here 
ln e represents the value of random error while the maintained hypothesis is that ln u 
represents the effect of competition on revenues.  The DFA concept relies on the 20
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assumption that ln e will average to a value close to zero while the average of ln ui will 
reflect the average effect of competition (ln ǌi).
23   
 
The i
th bank or country with the lowest average residual (ln ǌmin) is also the bank or 
country where the variation in underlying cost and productivity explains the greatest 
amount of the variation in revenues.  This minimum value defines the competition 
frontier and the relative competition efficiency (CEi) of all the other i banks or countries 
in the sample is determined by their dispersion from this frontier: 
 
    CEi = exp (ln ǌi - ln ǌmin) – 1 = (ǌi /ǌmin) – 1     (6) 
 
As the term ui is multiplicative to the dependent variable in an unlogged equation (5), the 
ratio (NII/OC)i = R (Cost, Productivity)i ui.  Thus the ratio ǌi /ǌmin is an estimate of the 
ratio NII/OC for the i
th bank or country, for a given level of underlying cost and service 
productivity, to the value of the ratio (NII/OC)min for the bank or country facing the 
greatest competition and having the same underlying cost and service productivity.
24 
 
If CEi = .25, then ǌi is 25% larger than ǌmin  so the unexplained portion of the revenue 
dependent variable in (5) is 25% larger than its minimum value at another bank or in 
another country.  This difference reflects the unspecified influence of competition.  Thus 
the larger is CEi, the weaker is the ability of market competition to restrain revenues.
25 
 
A limitation is that (6) only indicates the relative level of competition: it can not 
determine the absolute level of competition even for the most competitive bank or 
country.  Consequently, it is important to examine the fit of the estimating equation since, 
if the R² is very high (e.g., .80 to .90 or above), the difference in relative competition 
measured by CE may not be very economically significant since the residuals ǌi and ǌmin  
are themselves absolutely small (regardless of their percent difference).
26 
                                                
23 Our frontier competition efficiency measure is similar in concept to an indicator developed by Boone 
(2008A and 2008B).  Boone relies on balance sheet data to compute the difference between reported total 
firm revenues and reported total variable costs, a spread that contains total fixed cost plus extra revenues 
associated with the degree of market competition.  We are interested in revenues for particular subsets of 
banking services (which are reported, but not in as much detail as we would like) but rely on statistical cost 
analysis to identify the (unreported) associated variable and fixed costs, leaving the effect of competition 
on revenues as an average residual. 
 
24 The ratio ǌi /ǌmin = [(NII/OC)i/R (Cost, Productivity)i]/[(NII/OC)min/R (Cost, Productivity)min] and when 
evaluated at the same mean level of underlying cost and service productivity, the predicted values of R 
(Cost, Productivity)i and R (Cost, Productivity)min are equal as both are at the same point on the estimated 
revenue curve, leaving the ratio (NII/OC)i/(NII/OC)min. 
 
25 The cost efficiency literature reports efficiency (EFF) and inefficiency (INEFF) values.  If efficiency is 
80% (EFF = .80), then inefficiency is INEFF = (1 - .80)/.80 = .25 or 25%.  In (6), CE reflects the relative 
weakness of competition in restraining revenues and is equivalent to INEFF which reflects relative 
weakness of cost efficiency. 
 
26 This qualification is not well-understood in the frontier literature.  Absolute differences in residuals need 
to be considered along with their relative size, so goodness of fit should be an additional consideration 
(Carbó, Humphrey, and Lopez del Paso, 2007).21
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3.5 Preliminary Indications of Cross-Country Bank/Payment Competition. 
 
Aggregate, country-level data were collected from publicly available sources over 20 
years (1987-2006) for 11 European countries.  Three separate panel cross-section SUR 
estimations of each regression in (3) and (4) were made and the three sets of residuals 
were then averaged for each country separately.  The resulting competition efficiency 
values (CE) are shown in the first two columns of Table 3 (along with their efficiency 
ranks, 1 being the most competitively efficient).
27 
 
Relatively high R² values were obtained and indicate that the eight operating cost, 
productivity, business cycle, and risk variables explain 78% to 95% of the cross-country 
variation in bank non-interest and loan-deposit spread revenues.  Another way to 
illustrate this is to compute the average percent that the residuals are of the two 
dependent variables for the three cross-section estimations.  These values were 4%, 6%, 
9%, 10% (twice), and 13%.  Thus the share of the value of revenues not explained, and 
maintained here to reflect the effect of competition, is rather small.  It is smaller still 
when one considers that revenues need to exceed costs by some degree in order to earn a 
positive return on invested capital or equity. 
 
    Table 3: Competition Efficiency for 11 European Countries    
   
    C E NII    C E SPREAD    
 
  U.K.   0.0%  (1  frontier)  4.9%  (11) 
  Spain   3.1  (2)   0.1  (2)   
  France   3.2  (3)   0.0  (1  frontier) 
 
  Netherlands  4.6  (4)   2.1  (6) 
  Norway  4.7  (5)   2.9  (9) 
  Denmark  5.3  (6)   1.9  (5) 
  Finland 5.9  (7)   2.2  (7) 
  Italy   6.9  (8)   2.5  (8) 
   
  Belgium  7.1  (9)   0.7  (3) 
  Germany  7.2  (10)   3.1  (10) 
    Sweden          13.5  (11)    1.3  (4) 
 
    Average          5.6%      2.0% 
  
                                                
27 In terms of model performance the Durbin-Watson statistics varied from 1.25 to 2.59.  As the time-series 
dimension of the three panel data sets used in the estimation of (3) and (4) is less than two-thirds of the 
cross-section dimension, data stationarity is not of great importance but, when tested, unit roots could be 
rejected in 75% of the cases. 
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In terms of determining competition efficiency, this means that ǌi and ǌmin are both 
relatively small so the computed CEi value is typically also low.  Indeed, the average CE 
values in Table 3 are 5.6% for non-interest income revenue sources and only 2% for loan-
deposit rate spread revenues so the average revenue differences associated with 
competition differences across countries are small.   
 
The U.K. is the most competitively efficient for non-interest income (and defines the NII 
frontier) but is the least efficient for spread revenues.  France is the most competitively 
efficient for the loan-deposit rate spread (and defines the SPREAD frontier).  As the 
differences in competitive efficiency are mostly small, it is probably best to focus only on 
the set of three countries that are ranked highest or lowest (done below).  By the 
standards of the cost efficiency literature where inefficiency is commonly found to be 
around 25%, competition inefficiency appears to be much smaller at least at the aggregate 
level between countries. 
 
  Table 4: Other Competition Measures for Same 11 Countries
28    
   
   H-Statistic   Profit/Revenue CR-3   
 
 U.K.   .76  (2)   .33  (6)     .51  (3) 
 Spain   .65  (4)   .40  (10)     .40  (1) 
 France   .61  (5)   .27  (5)     .57  (5) 
 
  Netherlands   1.01  (1)    .18  (2)     .88  (9) 
 Norway  .54  (8)     na      na   
 Denmark  .22  (10)   .37  (7)     .75  (6) 
 Finland .41  (9)   .39  (9)     .93  (10) 
 Italy   .09  (11)   .22  (4)     .41  (2) 
 
 Belgium  .56  (7)   .11  (1)     .79  (8) 
 Germany  .70  (3)   .20  (3)     .55  (4) 
 Sweden .58  (6)   .38  (8)     .78  (7) 
  
Using the same country ranking of Table 3, three other indicators of country-level 
banking competition are shown in Table 4.  This concerns an H-statistic, a ratio of pre-tax 
bank profit to revenues for retail activities, and the share of retail banking income of the 
top three banks in estimated total retail income (CR-3, a revenue concentration ratio). 
While there is some consistency across these measures, it is sporadic.  For example, 
Spain and Italy are the most competitive countries according to the revenue concentration 
ratio (lowest CR-3) but the H-statistic ranks Italy last with the lowest relationship 
between input costs and output price (suggesting that prices are not determined by costs). 
While Italy has the lowest ratio of retail profits to revenue, suggesting competition, both 
CENII and CESPREAD (Table 3) rank Italy 8th in competition efficiency.  Further, the 
                                                
28 Sources: H-statistic (Bikker, J., L. Spierdijk, and P. Finnie, 2007, Table 2); Profit/Revenue and CR-3 
(Economic Commission, 2007, Figures 5 and 1, respectively). 
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profit/revenue ratio suggests that Spain (which has the highest ratio of retail profits to 
revenues) is ranked as the most uncompetitive but in terms of non-interest income 
activities (CENII), Spain appears to be very competitive.  Overall, the R
2s between the H-
statistic, the profit/revenue ratio, and the CR-3 revenue concentration measure range from 
.02 to .05 across the 11 countries.  The R
2s are only slightly higher when these three 
measures are related to CENII or CESPREAD  where the range is from .00 to .13. 
 
The weak correlations among the competition indicators are not improved by much when 
the focus is only the three most competitive and least competitive countries shown in 
Table 5.  Overall, the most competitive countries would seem to include the U.K. and 
Spain while the least competitive would be Finland as they all were ranked 
highest/lowest in 3 out of the 5 measures.  However, Belgium and Germany were ranked 
as most competitive as well as least competitive in 2 out of the 5 measures, attesting to 
the weak consistency of the measures.  Thus choice of a competition measure by 
researchers can affect the conclusion reached. 
 
    Table 5: Most and Least Competitive Countries       
  
        Profit/ 
  C E NII   CESPREAD H-Statistic  Revenue  CR-3   
 
Most   U.K.   France   Netherlands  Belgium  Spain 
Competitive  Spain   Spain   U.K.   Netherlands  Italy 
  France   Belgium  Germany  Germany  U.K. 
 
Least   Belgium  Norway  Finland  Sweden  Belgium 
Competitive  Germany Germany Denmark Finland  Netherlands 
  Sweden U.K.   Italy   Spain   Finland 
4. Transaction Pricing of Payment Services. 
 
The effect of changes in bank productivity, payment transaction and ATM scale 
economies, as well as labor and capital factor input costs across 11 countries on non-
interest income and loan-deposit rate spread revenues (the two dependent variables) are 
illustrated in Table 6.  The elasticities shown are averages across 11 countries for the 
entire 20 year period.  In terms of productivity effects, the 6.6% average annual reduction 
in the labor/deposit ratio the countries experienced (not shown) is associated with 
significant increases in the ratios of both non-interest income and spread revenues to 
operating cost in Table 6, row 1.  However, the benefit of reducing the number of 
workers per value of deposits "produced" (similar to a lower input/output ratio) is to 
some degree offset by the negative elasticity for the price of labor, indicating that the 
4.4% annual rise in unit labor cost for the 11 countries (not shown) significantly lowers 
spread revenues.  There is no significant labor price offset for non-interest income 
activities so the rise in labor productivity allows these revenues to be higher. 
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As noted earlier, marked differences in the size of branch offices across countries means 
that these offices are not comparable and could not be used as a variable in our analysis.   
For example, the average U.K. office with over 20 workers is effectively producing three 
times the service flow as a Spanish office which averages 6 to 7 workers.  This 
comparability problem is partly overcome by the use of a labor/deposit ratio since the 
numerator includes all branch and back office employees in a country.  Countries that 
have strongly substituted ATMs for branches also have reduced their work force so 
changes in total employment are related to changes in a country's reliance on branches to 
deliver deposit services.   
 
Although there is no similar comparability problem with ATMs, the ATM/deposit ratio 
elasticity is not significant in either equation.  Since the numerator of the labor/deposit 
ratio approximates the total service flow from branches and this labor-dependent flow is 
typically inversely related to ATMs, these two productivity indicators are somewhat 
related.   
 
    Table 6: Elasticities of the Cost Effect on Revenues 
________________________________________________________________ 
    Non-Interest  Income  Loan-Deposit  Rate 
    Activity  Revenues  Spread  Revenues________                          
Productivity:    
     Labor/Deposit ratio    -.38*      -.77* 
    ATM/Deposit ratio       .07      -.04 
 
Scale Economy:     
    Payment Cost Index      .81*       .31° 
    ATM Cost Index        .06      -.22* 
 
Factor Input Cost:     
    Price of Labor        .04              -1.04* 
    Capital Opportunity Cost    -.56*       .43* 
 
Risk Influences: 
    Business Cycle      2.80° 
    Capital/Loan ratio             .13_____________ 
* (°) Elasticity is significantly different from zero at p-value = .01 (.05).     
 
Due to the existence of strong scale economies the reduction in unit payment cost is 
estimated to be 4.1% annually.  Multiplied by the payment cost elasticity of .81 in Table 
6, the reduction in unit payment cost is associated with a 3.3% yearly fall (not rise) in the 
ratio of non-interest activity revenues as a percent of operating cost.  The reduction in 
spread revenues is smaller at 1.3% annually.  Both results are odd since scale economies 
should reduce costs in both non-interest income and spread activities allowing for higher 25
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revenues.  The explanation is that scale economies reduce unit costs while total payment 
operating expenses rise as payment volumes expand (rising by 6.1% annually).
29 
 
Total revenues could rise to offset the increase in total operating cost (the denominator in 
the non-interest income dependent variable) if payment transactions were directly priced 
but this is not common in Europe.  Although more and more banking services are being 
priced and some transaction-based fees have been instituted, only Norway has 
implemented transaction-based pricing for all payment services.  Thus a significant 
source of revenues is not being tapped, likely due to depositor views that payment 
services have been "free" and antitrust strictures against banks coordinating the 
implementation of pricing so as not to disrupt deposit market shares if only one or a few 
banks implemented transaction pricing.
30 
 
ATM networks also experience scale economies and unit ATM costs are estimated to fall 
by 5.5% annually.  In contrast to non-cash payment services, banks do price some ATM 
cash withdrawals (usually those made by customers of other banks) and the expansion of 
ATM networks are viewed as an important element of strategic non-price competition to 
attract and hold depositors.  Consequently, as ATM networks expand and unit costs fall, 
there is a significant rise in spread revenues as a percent of operating costs (offsetting any 
reduction in spread revenues associated with having a high ATM/deposit ratio). 
 
The results of Table 6 support the proposition that, since banks do not generally price 
payment services on a per transaction basis, they may seek higher revenues to cover 
higher operating costs as payment volume expands by instituting and raising prices that 
are largely disconnected from changes in payment volume.  Looked at in isolation, this 
suggests the exercise of market power (c.f., European Commission, 2007).  However, 
such pricing behavior can also be associated with not tying prices to unit costs whereby 
revenues would rise “automatically” with volume growth as scale economies are realized. 
  
In this regard transaction pricing would benefit banks by tying revenues more closely to 
costs so management obtains a clearer picture of where their profits are generated, 
permitting more efficient use of internal investment resources.  Transaction pricing would 
also benefit consumers allowing them to balance better the cost of using different 
payment instruments with their assessment of the benefits, saving resources for the 
economy as a whole. 
 
 
                                                
29 This occurs when payment volume at each bank expands over time.  However, when banks' payment 
processing centers are consolidated across borders (as envisioned by SEPA), a bank's given payment 
volume is combined with that of others so unit costs and total operating costs at the combined banks will 
both fall due to scale economies.
30 Norway coordinated the timing of when payment pricing would be implemented but there was no 
agreement on the price to be charged (and some banks did not initially price at all).  The quid pro quo was 
the elimination of payment float--a benefit for depositors (Enge and Øwre, 2006). Pricing was efficient: it 
speeded up the adoption of lower cost electronic payments by 20% (Bolt, Humphrey, and Uittenbogaard, 
2008). 26
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We have demonstrated that strong scale economies are associated with bank payment 
activities as well as with the size of bank ATM and branch office networks.  Indeed, 
relating bank operating cost to point of sale and bill payment transaction volumes across 
11 European countries over 1987-2004 suggests that a doubling of payment volume 
increases operating expenses by only around 27%, so average payment costs could 
potentially fall by 37%.  In an earlier analysis over a shorter period (1987-1999), bank 
operating expenses at European banks were estimated to be some $32 billion lower than 
they would otherwise have been due to the realization of payment scale economies, the 
shift from paper-based to cheaper electronic payments, and a corresponding shift away 
from expensive branch offices to ATMs for cash acquisition.  These statistical estimates 
are seemingly supported by the observed fall in the ratio of bank operating cost to asset 
value in 11 European countries by 34% over the 1987-2004 period. 
 
Considering the apparent reduction in bank operating expenses, it is of interest to see how 
competitive European banking markets may be since cost reductions are more likely to be 
passed on over time to users of banking services in a competitive market rather than 
mostly retained as higher profits.  Unfortunately, the extant competition indicators that 
focus on market concentration, price mark-up over cost, or covariation of price with cost 
changes often give conflicting results.  As found in a study covering 14 European 
countries over 1995-2001 covering 1,912 banks, the R
2 between the Lerner Index and the 
H-Statistic was only .06 while the R
2 between a HHI concentration measure and the 
Lerner Index and H-statistic was, respectively, .09 and .05.  Even looking at each of these 
countries separately over time, the relationship between these three commonly used 
indicators was often negative when one would expect a positive correlation. 
 
The apparent inconsistency among current indicators of market competition and our 
interest in trying to assess the competitiveness of bank payment activities, suggests that a 
different indicator may be useful.  Bank revenue data is reported in more detail than 
pricing information and this permitted us to assess the degree of cross-country 
competition for three main service categories: traditional banking services associated 
with funding loans with deposits (loan-deposit rate spread), activities associated with 
non-interest income (which includes payment services), and securities trading activities 
which are important for liquidity.  As securities trading takes place in competitive 
domestic and international markets, our revenue-based competition measures focus on 
the loan-deposit rate spread and non-interest income activities of the same 11 European 
countries over 1987-2006.  While the procedure used to derive our cross-country 
competition measures borrows from the efficient frontier literature and estimates a 
competition frontier, the framework is not very different from the theoretically-based 
industrial organization approach of Boone (2008). 
 
Our results suggest that cross-country differences in banking market competition are not 
large and that cost and productivity differences by themselves “explain” 78% to 95% of 
the variation in banking revenues for the six time periods our frontier model was 
estimated for our two measures during 1987-2006.  This suggests that the large 27
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differences in individual banking service prices reported in a recent study (European 
Commission, 2007) do not seem to roll over into correspondingly large revenue 
differences, at least in the more aggregative loan-deposit rate spread and non-interest 
income activities the current data restricts us to. 
 
It was also found that the estimated 4.1% annual reduction in unit payment cost is 
associated with a 3.3% yearly fall (not rise) in the ratio of non-interest activity revenues 
as a percent of operating cost while the expectation would be that realized scale 
economies lower unit costs and presumably raise revenues.  This suggests that bank 
prices are not closely tied to unit costs where revenues would rise “automatically” as 
service/payment volume expands even as unit costs fall due to scale economies.  Thus a 
significant source of revenues is not being tapped 
 
In addition, efforts to raise bank prices to offset rising total operating costs when these 
prices are not closely tied to the volume of services being provided could well generate 
the wrong signal to regulatory authorities who may interpret the higher prices as the 
exercise of market power.  More importantly, since unit payment costs have been falling, 
this alters the cost-benefit trade-offs needed to be observed and made by banks for 
profitably allocating internal investment funds and by consumers for making an informed 
choice among the banking services being offered.  To respond efficiently to these 
changes, prices and revenues need to closely mirror unit costs and thus changes in 
volume.  Finally, in countries where banks rely on the loan-deposit rate spread to cover a 
portion of their payment expenses, low interest rate environments—such as the one being 
currently experienced--reduce these margins but not payment expenses which can be 
more properly covered using transaction pricing. 28
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